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Introduction 
 
Since the time of the pre-Socratic philosophers, one of the most persistent and 
pervading questions in Western philosophy has been the ‘problem’ of the one and the 
many and/or identity and difference. As Richard Bernstein notes, “Western 
philosophy began with this ‘problem’: philosophers have always been concerned with 
understanding what underlies and pervades the multiplicity, diversity, and sheer 
contingency that we encounter in our everyday lives”.1 It is, then, by no means a 
coincidence that the main dissatisfactions with the project of European modernity, at 
least since Nietzsche, converged around the criticism that the dominant tendency in 
Western philosophy and metaphysics has been to privilege and valorise unity, 
harmony, totality and, thereby, to denigrate, suppress, or marginalise multiplicity, 
contingency, particularity, singularity. Similarly, until the advent of Critical Theory 
and post-structuralist approaches in International Relations (IR)
2
, the prioritisation of 
sameness over difference had been scarcely recognised as such by the debates in the 
field, even though it implicitly permeated the underlying epistemological and 
ontological assumptions of the various mainstream theories that competed for 
exegetic primacy in the discipline. Nonetheless, although the issue of exposing the 
practices of exclusion and eradication of difference, against what was seen as the 
naturalisation of historically contingent power structures, was gradually recognised as 
                                                 
1
 Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 58. 
2
 In the context of International Relations , the terms ‘Critical Theory’ and ‘post-structuralism’ are used 
to refer to theorists relating their work to the Frankfurt School (particularly Habermas), on the one 
hand, and to primarily French post-structuralist theorists (Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and Levinas), on 
the other. Within this essay the work of Linklater, who mainly relies on Habermas, and Shapcott, who 
relies on Habermas and Gadamer, is used to exemplify ‘Critical Theory’ and, in particular, their own 
critical version of dialogic cosmopolitanism; the work of Ashley and Walker, and Campbell is used to 
exemplify ‘post-structuralism’. The term ‘critical approaches’ is alluding to both types of critical 
theorising in IR. 
  
3 
 
a legitimate and long-missing critique in the field of IR,
3
 it is not yet clear what this 
recognition entails in terms of the possibility of transcending the division between 
identity and difference. In other words, do critical approaches in IR succeed in 
articulating a true reconciliation between self and other without objectifying the 
other’s alterity? Or does any effort to avoid committing injustice to difference 
inescapably foreclose any possibility of communication between self and other? 
To begin with, the analysis will build on the distinction between the relative 
and the absolute interpretation of otherness most prominently found in the work of 
two philosophers both belonging to the phenomenology tradition, Georg Hegel and 
Emmanuel Levinas. The main argument this paper will be putting forward is that, in 
responding to the ‘enigma’ of otherness through either a relative or an absolute 
understanding of alterity, the most promising critical approaches in IR theory tend to 
oscillate between two equally uncritical options: they either compromise the other’s 
true alterity so she or he becomes a mirror image of the self or, in fear of some 
totalising reduction bordering on violence, make the difference between sameness and 
strangeness so inaccessible that communication becomes impossible. Put differently, 
the argument is that albeit driven by different aspirations – namely either to bridge the 
gap between identity and difference or to question the prioritisation of identity by 
calling for a strategic preoccupation with alterity – critical theorising in IR appears to 
compromise its critical edge through relapsing into either assimilationism or radical 
incommensurability. Yet, it should be noted that drawing any authoritative 
generalisations over the capacity of critical IR theory in toto to articulate otherness 
persuasively is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, by presenting the limitations 
and contradictions of some nuanced critical approaches in IR theory in their treatment 
                                                 
3
 See, for instance, Yosef Lapid, ‘The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a 
Post-Positive Era’, International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989), pp. 235–54. 
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of alterity, this paper offers not an exhaustive account but a suggestive indication of 
the paradoxes involved in the politics of critique when applied on the self/other 
problematique. 
 
 
Hegel and relative otherness 
 
In his Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations, Richard 
Shapcott engages with the work of Tzvetan Todorov in an effort to unpack the 
patterns of interaction that emerge when the self encounters the other for the first 
time.
4
 In Todorov’s study, the two sides of the Indians and the Spanish, after the 
shock of the first encounter, engage in a series of different types of relationships that 
range from aggressive forms of interaction like enslavement, colonialism and 
conquest to milder ones but still within the horizon of European self-understanding 
like communication, love and knowledge. According to Shapcott, these terms attempt 
to reveal and explain what sorts of moral action are generated by the knowledge (or 
ignorance) of the other’s alterity. Unlike Wendt5, who stresses the importance of the 
first gestures that signal the quality of the contact between Ego and Alter, Todorov 
points to deeply entrenched worldviews that predetermine both the gestures and the 
contact. This is more than obvious in Columbus’ egocentric confrontation with the 
other. Columbus discovers the Indians, but not their alterity, since it seems that even 
before the initial contact he relies on a set of conceptual preconditions and practices 
which are a result of his previous acculturation in a late medieval Christian 
                                                 
4
 See Richard Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 14-29 and Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The 
Question of the Other (New York: Harper & Row, 1984). 
5
 See Alexander E. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics’, International Organization 46 (1992), pp. 391–425. 
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environment. Todorov labels the behaviour that derives from this pattern of 
preconceptions a ‘double movement’: 
 
Either he conceives the Indians (though without using these words) as human beings 
altogether, having the same rights as himself; but then he sees them not only as equals but 
also as identical, and this behavior leads to assimilationism, the projection of his own 
values on the others. Or else he starts from the difference, but the latter is immediately 
translated into terms of superiority and inferiority (in his case, obviously, it is the Indians 
who are inferior) … These two elementary figures of the experience of alterity are both 
grounded in egocentrism, in the identification of our own values with values in general, of 
our I with the universe – in the conviction that the world is one.6 
 
Shapcott is effectively employing Todorov’s study to highlight that the most likely 
outcome of trying to make sense of difference in our own terms before the actual 
engagement with alterity would be the inability to establish genuine communication 
with the other. Our discovery of difference is haunted by our efforts to engage with 
alterity in a meaningful (to us) way. In a similar vein, Inayatullah and Blaney argue 
that what is truly other in alterity remains beyond immediate recognition:  
 
[t]he initial revelation of difference by the self is ‘translated’ as the ‘inferiority’ of the 
other. Further contact may lead to the discovery or construction of commonality. 
However, this commonality (and purported equality) is established at the price of the 
disregard of difference, leading to a projection of values on the other, a demand for 
assimilation.
7
  
                                                 
6
 Todorov, The Conquest of America, pp. 42-43.  
7
Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, ‘Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International 
Relations Theory’, in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich 
Kratochwil (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 75. For a more comprehensive treatment of the 
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Equally, Connolly argues that conquest and conversion function together as premises 
and signs of superiority: “each supports the other in the effort to erase the threat that 
difference presents to the surety of self-identity”.8 What both Todorov and Connolly 
describe here is a pre-Hegelian state of affairs: in the process of realising its project of 
identification, the individual constructs its identity in relation to a series of differences 
which are recognised by a knowing subject as objects of knowledge and are, 
subsequently, converted into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty. 
However, as Hegel explains time and again in the Phenomenology of Spirit
9
 
through the enumeration of the repeated failures of the subject’s endeavours – he calls 
them ‘shapes of consciousness’ – to impose his vision on the social universe, the ‘big 
Other’ of the social substance always returns to upset the self’s teleological project.10 
Hegel is never tired of reminding us that the very fact of identity’s constitution 
through differentiation contributes to its inherent instability. In fact, Hegel’s 
renowned sections on the master–slave dialectic can actually be construed as one of 
the most trenchant theoretical accounts of the subject’s failed process of 
identification. In the paragraphs which preface the Lordship and Bondage section 
(paras 166–177) Hegel tells us that “self consciousness is desire” and as such is 
“certain of itself only by superseding the other”, “certain of the nothingness of this 
other” and that self-consciousness achieves only an imperfect realisation of this desire 
                                                                                                                                            
problem see Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of 
Difference (New York and London: Routledge, 2004). 
8
 William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 43. Connolly’s book here, as previously Todorov’s and Inayatullah 
& Blaney’s, are used to set up the contours of a pre-Hegelian understanding of otherness. To this 
extent, I am not engaging with the full implications of their work; rather, I am selectively using the 
diagnostic part of it.     
9
 Georg F. W. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). All references 
from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit will be provided by indicating the paragraph number in A. V. 
Miller’s 1977 translation. 
10
 For a Žižekian reading of Hegel that I am alluding to here see Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: 
The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London, New York: Verso, 1999).  
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when it “destroys the independent object” in a merely ‘objective’ or natural manner 
(paras 174–175). Therefore, if the subject is to be able to integrate for herself her 
opposed views of herself as ‘self-consciousness’ (as independent, as determining for 
herself what counts for her) and as ‘life’ (as being dependent on the given structure of 
organic desire), she must be able to find some desire that is not simply given but is a 
desire that comes out of her nature as a self-conscious independent agent per se. 
These requirements are met by the subject’s having a desire for recognition 
(Annerkenung) as an independent agent by another self-conscious agent. This is what 
Hegel means when he writes that self consciousness as desire “achieves its 
satisfaction only in another self-consciousness” (para 175), and that the goal which 
lies ahead is “the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which … 
enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’” (paras 
175, 177). The encounter between the two self-conscious agents is the “attempt on the 
part of each to impose his own subjective point of view on the other and to claim for 
his own subjective point of view the status of being the “true”, the objective, 
impersonal point of view”.11 The struggle is therefore not just over the satisfaction of 
desire but over what is to count as the objective point of view and thus what is to 
count as the truth. What Hegel succeeds in illuminating here is the inadequacy of 
approaches that preserve a self-contradictory distinction between the self and its other 
or the one-sidedness of those approaches which fail to account for a convincing 
reconciliation between the subjective and the objective point of view. Eventually, 
what performs the reconciliation for Hegel is the notion of ‘Spirit’. Without Spirit, 
self-consciousness remains abstract and decontextualised.  
                                                 
11
 Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), p. 59. 
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However, legitimate objections have been raised at this point concerning the 
terms of this reconciliation, as it may be said that it takes place in the terrain of self-
consciousness, thus tacitly affirming the priority of the reasoning individual. 
According to that line of argument, self-consciousness perceives the possible gap 
between self-certainty, i.e. the subjective take on what is happening, and what is 
called the ‘truth’ as a kind of social pathology, a contradiction that must be overcome. 
The experience of such a gap is what Hegel appeals to as the engine for conceptual 
and social change, a striving for reconciliation and mutuality in such a context. In 
other words, it is the self-consciousness’s inability to account for its claims on its own 
terms that drives the striving for unity in the form of a reconciliation between the 
subjective and the objective point of view. In the master–slave dialectic each has 
found out that “she cannot identify what is her own without reference to the other’s 
point of view – without, that is, reference to the sociality common to both”.12 What 
counts as her own projects for the master cannot be unambiguously identified without 
incorporating some references to the slave’s projects and vice versa.  
However, the criticism continues, what unites the two perspectives is the need 
to establish the priority of a non-contradictory sense of identity for the subject-knower 
(either the master or the slave). In Hegel’s defence, it has been argued that Hegel has 
been prominent in showing us the incompleteness of this process: what Hegel really 
implies is that, to the extent pure identity is a mere illusion, the terms of the 
assimilation performed by self-consciousness remain inherently unstable: the famous 
Hegelian negation of the negation is nothing other than the very logical matrix of the 
necessary failure of the subject’s teleological activity.13 Nonetheless, the counter-
argument goes, even if we accept that the Absolute Spirit has no positive content of its 
                                                 
12
 Ibid, p. 62. 
13
 See Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, p. 77. 
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own (a non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel), and is just the succession of all 
dialectical transitions, of its impossibility of establishing a final overlapping between 
the subjective and the objective viewpoint, the logical necessity of the link between 
the two affirms the hegemonic priority of Reason.
14
 
That said, it has also been persuasively argued that Hegel does not aspire to 
the holism of a ‘substance’ metaphysics, or to a mystical unification of all in the One. 
Instead, Hegel's holism is relational in the sense that his self-differentiating holism 
must include both identity and difference.
15
 However, doubts have been voiced as to 
whether, in his scheme, Difference and the Other are taken to be ineradicable as the 
ordering and structuring principles of the whole as opposed to being mere transitory 
moments, logical categories swept away in the Spirit’s actual movement towards a 
consistent and non-contradictory narrative of the reasoned individual. Precisely for 
this reason, his philosophical project has been reproached, most prominently by 
Levinas, for affirming the philosophical imperialism of the privileged self which 
seeks to lift all contradictions with the external world through a learning process that 
is nothing other than the ‘primordial work of identification’.16 Yet, it should be noted 
that by interpreting the subject’s activity of mediation as a movement of appropriation 
as opposed to Hegel’s insistence that it is the repeated failure to achieve this end that 
is constitutive of ‘reality’, this latter criticism risks misrepresenting Hegel’s corrective 
                                                 
14
 See Ernesto Laclau, ‘Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution of 
Political Logics’, in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London and New York: Verso, 2000), pp. 60–1. 
Laclau writes: “As in most post-Kantian Idealist systems, Hegel aspires to a presuppositionless 
philosophy. This means that the irrational – and ultimately contradictory – moment of the thing in itself 
has to be eliminated. Furthermore, if Reason is going to be its own grounding, the Hegelian list of 
categories cannot be a catalogue, as in Aristotle or Kant – the categories have to deduce themselves 
from each other in an orderly fashion. This means that all determinations are going to be logical 
determinations. Even if something is irrational, it has to be retrieved as such by the system of Reason.” 
15
 See Robert R.Williams, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1992), pp. 78 and 270. 
16
 Levinas Emmanuel, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1969), p. 36. 
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to Kant. Hegel’s unprecedented contribution lies exactly in amending the 
inadequacies of Kantian formalism through lifting the duality created by the 
abstractness of an apperceptive self as opposed to an empirical self,
17
 thus providing a 
form of idealism that avoids solipsism. Hegel, eventually, managed to show that:  
 
…there is no escape from the limitations of external facticity not because there is an 
abyssal gap between the knowing subject and its object but because we (meaning any 
self-conscious being) are the limitations of our external facticity: we are what we 
learn, what we have learned and also what do not and have not learned.
18
  
 
Having said that, Levinas’ criticism is not to be lightly dismissed as it does 
point to an underlying motif in speculative idealism in terms of its understanding of 
the relationship between tautology and heterology. The heart of the problem lies in 
what philosophers stipulate as the distinction between relative and absolute otherness. 
Ultimately, Hegel’s treatment of the self/other relation seems to conform to what 
Kearney alludes to as the relative understanding of otherness
19
. Kearney notes that 
Plato in the Sophist puts the interrogation of otherness into the mouth of the Eleatic 
stranger (xenos):  
 
For the Eleatic stranger the other is other only in relation to the same. The other as a 
distinct class is not comprehensible unless it is considered relative to some other 
(pros heteron). The complete separation of the same (autos) and other (heteron), of 
                                                 
17
 See John Mc Dowell, ‘The Apperceptive I and the Empirical Self: Towards a Heterodox Reading of 
“Lordship and Bondage” in Hegel’s Phenomenology’ in Hegel: New Directions, ed. Katerina 
Deligiorgi (Montreal: Mc Gill-Queens University Press, 2006). 
18
 Kimberly Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p. 76. 
19
 Richard Kearney, Strangers, Gods and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness (London: Routledge, 
2003), p. 16. 
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being and what is other than being, would be the obliteration (apophasis) of all 
speech.
20
  
 
For any engagement with the other to be even utterable within the self’s horizon of 
understanding, the other has to undergo a significant transmutation: its absolute 
otherness as manifested in its unassimilated singularity is irredeemably lost at the 
expense of its meaningful association with the same. Or more simply put, “any 
relation with the Absolute makes the absolute relative”.21It is on this point that 
adherents of an absolute interpretation of otherness would castigate Hegel’s 
movement as one that is constituted under the terms of the knowing and appropriating 
subject and one that inevitably leads to the subsumption of the other’s true alterity. 
Hence, for a thinker like Levinas, the desire to understand is the centre of the 
problem. For Levinas’ concern is to try to understand the other without using the 
violence of comprehension to do so. To understand the other by comprehension, the 
argument goes, is to reduce other to self. It is to deprive the other precisely of the very 
alterity by which the other is other. Even if, as in the case of Hegel, identity is 
constituted through differentiation and, thus is denied any reification or naturalness, 
alterity as such is not recognised in its own terms. The task of the next section is to 
examine these objections in detail. 
 
 
Levinas and absolute otherness 
 
                                                 
20
 Kearney, Strangers, Gods and Monsters, p. 15 
21
 Ibid 
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As Bernstein informs us, “Levinas reads the entire project of the history of 
Western philosophy, whose destiny has been shaped by the classical Greek 
problematic, as functioning within what he calls ‘the Same and the Other’”.22 For 
Levinas, the main objective of Western metaphysics has always been to reduce, 
absorb, or appropriate what is taken to be the other to the primacy of ontology as the 
discourse uniquely able to discover and describe the ultimate structure of reality. In 
the process of finding criteria for human action that are universally intelligible and 
valid for everyone, the philosophical tradition from Parmenides to Heidegger 
attempted to reduce all forms of otherness to what Levinas, following Plato, calls the 
same (le même; to auton).
23Parmenides stated it in the form: ‘thought and being are 
the same’,24 with a radicality and simplicity which dissolves difference and otherness 
in the identification of thought and being. This “imperialistic gesture, a gesture to 
conquer, master and colonise the Other”, reveals the violence committed against the 
other’s singularity or, as Levinas calls it, the other’s absolute exteriority (l’autrui) that 
is not reducible to any reciprocal relationship with the same.
25
 For Levinas, this 
violence reaches its apotheosis in Hegel: 
 
The ‘I’ is not a being that always remains the same, but is the being whose existing 
consists in identifying itself, in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it. It is 
the primary identity, the primordial work of the identification … Hegelian 
phenomenology, where self-consciousness is the distinguishing of what is not distinct, 
                                                 
22
 Bernstein, The New Constellation, p. 70 
23
 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1999), p. 6. 
24
 Cf. Joan Stambaugh, ‘Introduction’, in Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan 
Stambaugh (New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 7. 
25
 Bernstein, The New Constellation, p. 69. 
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expresses the universality of the same identifying itself in the alterity of objects thought 
and despite the opposition of self to self.
26
 
 
Levinas interprets Hegelian phenomenology as affirming “the return of absolute 
thought to itself, the identity of the identical and the non-identical in consciousness of 
self recognizing itself as infinite thought, ‘without other’”.27 Consequently, ‘alterity’ 
has no singular metaphysical status outside what is ontologically the same apart from 
being a ‘moment’ within the same: “‘all exteriority’ is reduced to or returns to the 
immanence of a subjectivity which itself, and in itself, exteriorizes itself”.28 Levinas 
boldly seeks to escape this ‘philosophical imperialism’ of the same by opening the 
space for an asymmetrical and nonreciprocal relation to the other’s alterity and our 
infinite responsibility to and for the other. The metaphysical other is an “other with an 
alterity that is not formal, is not the simple reverse of identity, and is not formed out 
of resistance to the same, but is prior to every initiative, to all imperialism of the 
same. It is other with an alterity constitutive of the very content of the other.”29 
For Levinas, we are responsible to alterity as absolute alterity, as difference that 
cannot be subsumed into the same, into a totalising conceptual system that 
comprehends and exhausts self and other. To acknowledge the otherness of the other 
(l’autrui), to keep it from falling back into the other of the same requires Levinas to 
speak of it as the ‘absolute other’. The French word ‘autrui’ refers to the other human 
being, “whom I cannot evade, comprehend, or kill and before whom I am called to 
justice, to justify myself.”30 It is this radically asymmetrical relation between the I and 
                                                 
26
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 36. 
27
 Emmanuel Levinas, Entre nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara 
Harshav (London: The Athlone Press, 1998), p. 137. 
28
 Levinas, ibid. 
29
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, pp. 38–9. 
30
 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p.  5. 
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the other (a ‘relation’ that defies reduction to reciprocal equality and, hence, rejects 
justice as impartiality) that characterises what Levinas calls the ethical relation. The 
ethical is therefore the location of a point of alterity, or what Levinas also calls 
‘exteriority’, that cannot be reduced to the same. In fact, the ethical ‘I’ is constituted 
as a subject “precisely insofar as it kneels before the other, sacrificing its own liberty 
to the more primordial call for the other”.31 At the same time, to be regarded ethically, 
the other must remain a stranger ‘who disturbs the being at home with oneself [le chez 
soi]’,32 who remains infinitely other. The ethical for Levinas is, finally, “a nonviolent 
relationship to the other as infinitely other”.33 Unlike the Hegelian narrative of 
overcoming contradiction and achieving reconciliation, Levinas suggests a journey 
towards “a pluralism that does not merge into a unity”.34 To represent the self’s 
journey towards alterity as a movement which exceeds the circle of the self and goes 
towards the other without ever turning back, Levinas juxtaposes Abraham’s journey 
to Odysseus’, which is the basis for the Hegelian dialectical journey in which alterity 
simply serves the enhancement of the self: “To the myth of Odysseus returning to 
Ithaca, we wish to oppose the story of Abraham, leaving his fatherland forever for a 
land yet unknown.”35 
By arguing for the incommensurability of the ‘Other’ with the ‘I’, Levinas is 
defending the ethical relation against any reduction to the totality of the same and the 
other.
36Levinas’ insistence on the lack of reconciliation and the asymmetrical quality 
                                                 
31
 Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney, ‘Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas’, in Face to Face with 
Levinas, ed. Richard A. Cohen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 27. 
32
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 39. 
33
 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, in 
Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 
102. 
34
 Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard Cohen (Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University 
Press, 1987), p. 42. 
35
 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘The Trace of the Other’, trans. Alphonso Lingis, in Deconstruction in Context: 
Literature and Philosophy, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 348. 
36
 Bernstein, The New Constellation, p. 70. 
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of the ethical relation with the other is inaugurating a radical understanding of ethical 
responsibility where I am always responsible for (to) the other’s alterity (l’autrui), 
regardless of the Other’s response to me. It is important to emphasise here that what 
Levinas understands as ‘responsibility’ is not a move of ontology’s imperial ‘I’, nor is 
it a form of co-responsibility “grounded in compassion, benevolence, or empathy”;37 
rather, responsibility is grounded on the non-reciprocity of the ethical relation: “In 
this sense, I am responsible for the Other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die 
for it. Reciprocity is his affair. It is precisely insofar as the relationship between the 
Other and me is not reciprocal that I am subjection to the Other; and I am ‘subject’ 
essentially in this sense”.38 With subjectivity redefined as subjection to the other’s 
infinite call, Levinas introduces one of the most radical themes of his thought on 
alterity, the idea that, “as a unique and noninterchangeable ‘I’, I am substitutable for 
another”.39 This idea of substitution, of putting oneself in the place of another is not 
so much a movement of an appropriating self-consciousness, but what he refers to as 
a ‘passivity’, wherein the self is absolved of itself.40 
However, it is exactly on this point that Derrida questions the intelligibility of 
Levinas’ notion of absolute exteriority. Derrida agrees with Levinas that “the other is 
the other only if his alterity is absolutely irreducible, that is, infinitely irreducible”.41 
But, contrary to Levinas, who claims that “to make the other an alter ego … is to 
neutralize its absolute alterity”, Derrida argues that “if the other was not recognized as 
ego, its entire alterity would collapse”. Against Levinas’ reading of Husserl, Derrida 
                                                 
37
 Patricia Molloy, ‘Face-to-Face with the Dead Man: Ethical Responsibility, State-Sanctioned Killing, 
and Empathetic Impossibility’, in David Campbell and Michael J. Shapiro, Moral Spaces: Rethinking 
Ethics and World Politics (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 220. 
38
 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard Cohen 
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claims that, according to Husserl, “the other as alter ego signifies the other as other, 
irreducible to my ego, precisely because it is an ego, because it has the form of the 
ego … This is why, if you will, he is face, can speak to me, understand me, and 
eventually command me”.42 In short, in a dramatic recap of a Hegelian theme, Derrida 
reminds us that “there is both sameness and radical alterity, symmetry and 
asymmetry, identity and difference in my relation with the other, and above all in the 
ethical relation.”43 For Derrida, without this acknowledgement no ethics would be 
possible. Pace Levinas, the other is absolutely other only if he is an ego, that is, in a 
certain way, if he is the same as I: “…without this, no letting-be would be possible 
and first of all, the letting be of respect and of the ethical commandment addressing 
itself to freedom. Violence would reign to such a degree that it would no longer even 
be able to appear and be named.”44 
 
Ultimately, what Derrida’s thought invites us to realise is that we can never escape the 
real practical possibility that we will fail to do justice to the alterity of the other. On a 
more profound level, this is a mere implication of our inability to escape metaphysics 
altogether: 
 
[T]here is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake 
metaphysics. We have no language - no syntax and no lexicon – which is foreign to this 
history; we can pronounce no single destructive proposition which has not already had to 
slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to 
contest.
45
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Derrida has effectively shown that Levinas’ language presupposes the very same 
Heideggerian ontological transcendence it seeks to overcome. While speech can 
counter the violence of language by disrupting language’s pretension to conceptual 
mastery – like Levinas’ notion of the way the ethical is performed in conversation, in 
a ‘saying’ that disrupts the ‘said’ – it must inevitably, to remain intelligible, do some 
violence and, thereby, affirm aspects of what it resists.
46
It is for this reason that 
Derrida argues that an ethical regard requires one to acknowledge this dilemma. The 
fact that we may recognise that the moment we enter the realm of language and 
conceptual understanding we commit violence against the other's singularity does not 
necessarily condemn us to absolute incommensurability. Rather, by admitting the 
continuing violence of one’s own discourse, one commits the least possible violence. 
On the contrary, the most violent position would precisely be a puritan and self-
righteous commitment to total non-violence.
47
 It is in this sense that Derrida’s notion 
of undecidability should be understood to be the necessary precondition for ethics and 
politics. Against criticisms that take it to be the very negation of politics and the 
denial of responsibility, Derrida constantly reminds us that to aspire to a world devoid 
of the undecidable would be to wish for the demise of politics, “for it would install a 
new technology, even if it was a technology that began life with the markings of 
progressivism and radicalism”.48It is to this Hegel-inspired Derridian point that we 
will return at the end of this paper to reach, hopefully, a better understanding of the 
self/other problematique within the purview of immanence. 
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Dialogic cosmopolitanism: the assimilative logic of universalism 
 
Introducing the above discussion into the realm of critical international theory 
obliges us to examine a critical brand of cosmopolitanism that is significantly inspired 
by the Hegelian striving for reconciliation between universality and particularity, 
namely the dialogic cosmopolitanism espoused by Andrew Linklater and Richard 
Shapcott.
49
 The purpose of this section is to show how their relative understanding of 
otherness coupled with the thin universalism of their critique usher in an implicit 
assimilationism in their work. Linklater’s seminal work The Transformation of 
Political Community is an exploration of the possibility of open dialogue with the 
other and of support for post-sovereign communities in which new articulations of 
universality and difference can be both imagined and attained. Consciously post-
Marxist, this approach tends to focus on the emancipatory potential inherent in 
Habermas’ discourse ethics and theory of historical development in order to identify 
the potential of modern states to transcend the state-centric logic of anarchy as 
depicted by realists. The key issue for this Habermasian rendition of critical 
international theory is how to accommodate the Enlightenment’s initial defence of 
universalism with the claim for difference into a single theoretical perspective. In a 
more profound sense, it is a question of how to strike the right balance between two 
features of the project of modernity: the ethos of critique and the spirit of 
cosmopolitanism.
50
 
This latter ambition translates into a particularly challenging task which, in 
many ways, is accountable for Critical Theory’s major pitfalls. Specifically, some 
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theorists have accused Habermasian Critical Theory of relying on uncritical 
assumptions about the criteria of judgement.
51
 This point can best be understood in 
terms of what Kimberly Hutchings describes as the paradoxical oscillation of the 
Kantian critical project “between limitation and legislation”.52 This is a wider 
philosophical puzzle that is constantly being reproduced since Kant’s unsuccessful 
attempt to bridge the gap between Nature and Freedom in his Critique of Judgement. 
In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant set out to define the limitations of critique’s 
legitimate function as the conditions of its possibility. Simultaneously, Kant accepted 
the fact that if theoretical reason is to escape the “dangers of unfounded dogmatism on 
the one hand and rampant scepticism on the other”, it has to legislate for itself the 
boundaries of its legitimate application.
53
 As a result the Kantian critique’s resolution 
to the problem of arbitrariness and relativism is based on an exclusionary practice 
where “pure reason is both on trial and judging”54 legislating for itself the appropriate 
preconditions of communication and defining the legitimate boundaries of 
conversation. 
In many ways, Linklater’s leaning on the Habermasian rendition of discourse 
ethics is rehearsing the ambiguities of the Kantian critical project. Discourse ethics’ 
legitimacy rests on a thin proceduralism which allows it to appear as an all-
encompassing framework for accommodating diverse ethical claims. At the same 
time, pluralism is not essentially accepted at face value but only as a rhetorical device 
since agreement is understood as convergence around a set of supposedly non-
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metaphysical presuppositions which are accepted on the basis of their alleged 
neutrality. What is usually silenced is that these decontextualised ‘impartial rules’ of 
engagement with difference are reflecting a particular, historically conditioned 
response to the challenge of diversity, “that of an ‘overlapping consensus’ of diverse 
worldviews around a minimal, non-metaphysical morality”.55 This is a distinctively 
European understanding of accommodating difference arising out of the devastating 
experience of religious strife and intransigence during the religious wars of 16
th
 and 
17
th
 century Europe. Ever since, tolerance was equated with the effort of establishing 
the impartial means by which different conceptions of the good can coexist and sort 
out their differences in peace. Impartiality and stability were elevated to the status of 
the only acceptable public values while comprehensive conceptions of the good life 
were reduced to mere aesthetic preferences or tastes on which there can be no rational 
agreement. 
Linklater insists that the ethical universalism of Critical Theory does not 
display any inherent aversion to cultural diversity and difference nor does it tacitly 
imply a secret agenda of “bringing aliens or outsiders within one homogeneous, moral 
association”.56 Discourse ethics, the argument goes, remains faithful to procedural 
universalism and the possibility of an ‘undistorted communication’ that would lead to 
a cross-communal understanding through the force of the better argument. What 
remains unsaid, according to Shapcott, is that conversation oriented towards 
universalism is only achievable between subjects who have reached a 
‘postconventional’ level of consciousness -that is, morally mature, reasonable beings 
                                                 
55
 Timothy S. Shah, ‘Making the Christian World Safe for Liberalism: From Grotius to Rawls’, in eds. 
David Marquand and Roland L. Nettler, Religion and Democracy, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
2000), p. 122 
56
 See Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, pp. 87–100. See also Andrew Linklater, 
‘The Achievements of Critical Theory’, in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 291. 
  
21 
 
able to be governed by the unforced force of the better argument- and as such it is “an 
advocacy of a particular conception of agency”.57 Shapcott goes on to imply that this 
particular type of agency privileges a culturally specific type of community which has 
traditionally been developed in the West by citing Seyla Benhabib’s reference to “a 
secular, universalist reflexive culture in which debate, articulation and contention 
about value questions as well as conceptions of justice and the good have become a 
way of life”.58 Shapcott’s critique has successfully shown that discourse ethics raise 
obstacles to communication with the radically different through exactly the same 
means employed to achieve universal inclusion.
59
 
 
Commenting on the Habermasian communicative ethics, Brown equally 
questions the potentiality of the Habermasian Critical Theory to embrace difference 
and points to the fact that the Habermasian notion of ‘ideal speech situation’60 relies 
uncritically on  a Western view of rationality as a transcultural and transhistorical 
criterion of judgement: “To believe in the desirability of transparency [the idea that, in 
principle, human communication could be free from distortion] comes close to a 
commitment to the elimination of difference, to a denial that the Other could be 
accepted as the Other.”61 Pluralism in this sense is understood as a platform of 
coexistence under the unifying effect of Western rationality and not as a true 
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affirmation of otherness. In this respect, discourse ethics “prescribes not only the 
procedure but also the content of dialogue, that is, of what are acceptable statements 
and topics, according to an already given definition of the moral realm, one which is 
constituted prior to the engagement with the other”.62 It comes, then, as no surprise 
that Walker considers Linklater’s project as the latest edition of idealism “except that 
this latest representative of the idealists has begun to temper his universalistic 
tendencies with an appropriately late-modern attention to difference and diversity”.63 
Instructed by Linklater’s shortcomings, Shapcott’s thin cosmopolitanism 
aspires to introduce a via media between the unreflected universalism of liberal 
cosmopolitanism, the slightly subtler universalism of Frankfurt School Critical 
Theory and the radical anti-universalism of post-structuralism. To achieve this 
objective, Shapcott employs Gadamerian hermeneutics in an attempt to provide a non-
foundational account of truth that would allow genuine communication between self 
and other. Philosophical hermeneutics, according to Shapcott, takes it that “the 
capacity for cross-cultural understandings is real and accompanies the development of 
language itself”.64 In the philosophical hermeneutic account, “the other is understood 
as a linguistically constituted agent from the start and, therefore, inherently capable of 
understanding and conversation”.65 The crux of this approach is the denial of any 
determinate understanding of the other prior to actual engagement. Conversation rests 
on the notion that “understanding refers to the subject matter (Die Sache) of 
conversation, to what is said, not the sayer, the text, not the writer”.66 
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Although Shapcott’s approach aspires to avoid assimilationism by pointing to 
our historical situatedness “that always informs our understandings”,67 Shapcott 
himself does not deny that philosophical hermeneutics and discourse ethics hold in 
common the argument that “dialogue requires that agents are prepared to question 
their own truth claims, respect the claims of others and anticipate that all points of 
departure will be modified in the course of dialogue”.68 Shapcott is right to point out 
that philosophical hermeneutics do not share the same interest in achieving a ‘thick’ 
kind of agreement but it is rather oriented towards the much thinner goal of 
understanding. One, however, wonders whether even this latter goal does not 
previously require the affirmation of the postconventional agent. Even if 
philosophical hermeneutics denounces the lapsus of determining universal principles 
for the conversation prior to the dialogical engagement, the moment of assimilation 
occurs in the argument that “[r]easoned conversation is a property of all humans who 
possess language”.69 
Shapcott is, of course, making the subtle point that the Gadamerian acount of 
conversation does not share the Habermasian conviction that “the capacity for 
thinking universally and post-traditionally…is a product of all who possesses (sic) 
language”70. In that sense, he claims, the qualities that characterise genuine dialogue 
cannot be confined to the ‘enlightend’ or ‘post-conventional’ individual. Shapcott 
insists that participants in a Gadamerian conversation are oriented towards the much 
more inclusive purpose of understanding rather than seeking rational agreement on 
‘thick’ moral principles that invite exclusion or assimilation. By following Benhabib 
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in dropping the Habermasian principle of Universalisation (U), Shapcott is confident 
that philosophical hermeneutics may forge new forms of non-assimilatory solidarity 
and community.  
Despite its inclusive potential, however, Shapcott’s dialogic cosmopolitanism 
remains ambiguously torn between an understanding of language as a non-
exclusionary ontological ground for conversation and the promotion of the 
cosmopolitan project. In fact, one is left wondering here whether the operation was 
successful but the patient has, unfortunately, passed away. With the absence of a 
normative consensus on the principles of conversation, Shapcott’s account may 
diminish the chances of assimilation but at the expense of his cosmopolitan intentions. 
Even if we accept that his model is less exclusionary than Habermas’, there is no 
sufficient ground to accept that linguistically constituted agents will engage in 
revitalising cosmopolitan solidarities instead of resorting to violence and dissent. In 
other words, in trying to avoid the assimilatory moment altogether Shapcott allows a 
gap between his ontology (language) and the emancipatory content of his prescription 
(thin cosmopolitanism) that is never persuasively addressed. Since, then, his 
cosmopolitan aspirations do not necessarily follow from his ontological givens, his 
commitment to a non assimilatory model of conversation serves only to dissimulate 
the violence of his discourse. In contrast, by accepting the necessary trade-off 
between assimilation and cosmopolitanism through the act of presupposing agents 
committed to principles of rational agreement, Habermas seems to be offering a 
defence of the cosmopolitan project less fraught with -but, of course, not devoid of- 
the pretensions of non-violence than Shapcott’s non assimilative version of 
cosmopolitanism.  
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Voices of dissidence in IR: oscillating between assimilation and 
incommensurability 
 
Post-structuralist theories of international relations are programmatically driven by 
an unconditional attentiveness to difference as well as a suspicion towards practices of 
unjustified exclusion. Ever since post-structuralist approaches were introduced in the 
discipline by Ashley’s challenge to Waltz’s mainstream neorealist project,71 the 
critique of what was seen as the reification of historically conditioned power 
structures, such as anarchy and sovereignty, was associated with an almost strategic 
preoccupation with expanding the realm of resistance. As George and Campbell 
proclaimed in a special edition containing landmark articles for post-structuralist 
approaches in the field: 
 
The (poststructuralist) project is a search for thinking space within the modern categories 
of unity, identity, and homogeneity; the search for a broader and more complex 
understanding of modern society which accounts for that which is left out - the other, the 
marginalized, the excluded.
72
 
 
Similarly, in their path-breaking article ‘Reading Dissidence/Writing the 
Discipline’, Ashley and Walker explicitly raised the question of how do we account 
for the claims of those that have been marginalised by mainstream interpretations of 
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international relations with their emphasis on territoriality.
73
 Ashley and Walker’s 
response to this challenge is to announce a critical theorising that calls for the 
questioning of all boundaries and established hierarchicalisations of power. The 
central issue, however, here is how can one engage in real conversation with the other 
and at the same time escape the ‘violence’ of freedom? This uneasiness in post-
sructuralist international thought has been typified by William Connolly as the 
‘second problem of evil’74: 
 
The second problem of evil is the evil that flows from the attempt to establish security 
of identity for any individual or group by defining the other that exposes sore spots in 
one’s identity as evil or irrational…Is it possible to counter the second problem of 
evil without eliminating the functions served by identity?
75  
 
Ashley and Walker are aware of the paradoxical status of their critique but they insist 
that the purpose of theorising from a ‘register of freedom’ can still be sustained if we 
construe this move as a project of ‘infinite subversion’ of sovereign authorities or as 
“theorising from the borderlines and as theorising from the void or no place”.76 
  
Some critics have been particularly dissatisfied by international post-
structuralist thought’s difficulty to justify the legitimacy of its own critical discourse. 
Attacked for rehearsing the inadequacies of the Kantian critical project, post-
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structuralism’s inability to secure the status of its own critique is attributed to its 
strategic preoccupation with alterity.
77
In other words, quite ironically, what was 
perceived to be post-structuralism’s critical credentials is eventually taken to pose the 
main impediment for its engagement with alterity in its own terms. In this regard, 
Shapcott is right to point out that “[i]n this conversation one engages with the other, 
not in order to understand them per se, but rather in order to prevent a further 
hardening of boundaries that limits their’s [sic] and one’s own freedom…whereby 
communication with the other is over-determined by the strategic purpose of 
expanding the realm of freedom”.78 Again, critique’s attempt to legitimise its own 
goals, in this case opening new spaces for the inclusion of the excluded and 
marginalised, is premised on a blanket acceptance of a certain mode of subjectivity. 
The agent of critique is a priori taken to be a self-reflective individual willing to 
decentre herself and to question her own beliefs. The spectre of the post-conventional 
agent, a product of a specific civilisation with a particular view of freedom understood 
as emancipation, is again haunting the terms of the communication with the other. 
Based on a relative understanding of otherness, Ashley and Walker’s account of 
freedom may avoid the pitfalls of an over-reliance on the Habermasian objective of 
emancipation but their implicit assumption is that the other would be willing to allow 
such a substantive transformation of herself that the final encounter would resemble 
more of a process of assimilation than unconditional conversation.
79
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Despite its emphasis on freedom and emancipation, this strand of international 
post-structuralist thought continues to rely heavily on a Kantian interpretation of 
ethics as an expression of an autonomous agent that interacts with alterity after its 
constitution as a moral subject. Hence, encountering the other can only be perceived 
in relative terms, meaning the self recognises the other only insofar as it relates to her 
on the basis of fixed identifications prior to the actual engagement. In contrast to the 
instrumentality of an approach strategically oriented to freedom, David Campbell 
offers an alternative post-structuralist ethics inspired by Levinas’ work. Campbell 
attempts to circumvent the traditional ethical approaches in IR which are mainly 
based on either deontological or utilitarian premises for justifying moral conduct. 
These approaches perceive the subject of politics and ethics as a unified moral agent 
ontologically prior to its engagement with the other. In contrast, Campbell, following 
Levinasian insights, seeks to reconstruct the possibility of an ethics as infinite 
responsibility towards the other. In pursuit of this end, however, Campbell castigates 
Levinas for compromising his infinite commitment to the other when confronted with 
the problem of the Third (le tiers) in politics. Specifically, Campbell identifies an 
insidious danger of ‘political totalitarianism’ in Levinas’ potential limiting of 
responsibility in view of the third Other and seeks to respond to this challenge via 
Derrida’s notion of undecidability.80 Derrida’s account of undecidability, of the 
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madness of the decision, acknowledges this dilemma and suggests the need for a 
‘double contradictory imperative’ wherein one acknowledges that in making a 
decision one is simultaneously asked to calculate the incalculable, to experience the 
possibility of an impossible justice manifested in doing justice and injustice to others 
by giving priority to some or one and not others or another.
81
 The need to respond to 
‘two contradictory injunctions’ demonstrates that questions of responsibility are not 
clear-cut and cannot be decided in a programmatic way prior to the engagement with 
the other.
82
 
Nonetheless, Campbell’s reservations for an uncritical endorsement of 
Levinasian ethics may be justified for more reasons than he deems necessary. Firstly, 
in its effort to escape the assimilative effects of traditional moral theory, the ethics of 
radical interdependence run the risk of throwing the baby out along with the bath 
water. As we have already discussed, Levinas develops an absolute view of ethical 
conduct that is located in the ineradicable difference between ‘I’ and the ‘Other’. The 
ethical relationship is one in which I respond to the other qua her or his alterity on the 
basis of a ‘response-ability’.83 In so far as the other cannot be known, cannot be 
negotiated with since any such move would irreparably compromise his or her 
alterity, I can only respond passively. Levinas insists that this has the meaning of 
rejecting the traditional discourse of equality as responsible for assimilating the 
other’s singularity. Nonetheless, some critics detect in this move a complete disregard 
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“for the needs of the self and for the other’s responsibility to the self”84 which 
ultimately proves unsustainable and self-defeating. If the Levinasian objection to the 
Habermasian communicative ethics is the elimination of radical difference, it is the 
self’s paralysing subordination to the absolute ineffability of otherness that is 
authoritative in Levinas’ ethics of proximity.85 
Surprisingly, however, Campbell’s recourse to Derrida as a corrective to 
Levinas’ absolute understanding of otherness, though inspired by deconstruction’s 
critical ambivalence, eventually fails to deliver its promise. Let me explain myself: if 
genuine responsibility is generated within the ethical space of the Derridian 
undecidable, then the call for “a different configuration of politics, one in which its 
purpose is the struggle for – or on behalf of - alterity, and not a struggle to efface, 
erase, or eradicate alterity”,86 does not remain faithful to the experience of aporia in 
every decision and ends up being a reversed form of totalising universalism. 
Campbell is right to evoke Derrida and argue for a politics which enacts the double 
injunction. But, in so far as he is reconfiguring politics as a struggle for alterity, he 
seems to deviate from this ethical commitment.
87
 Rather, it is one of Derrida’s lessons 
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that violence in the form of arbitrary authority is an inevitable part of the madness of 
the decision. Undecidability implies that a truly critical attitude towards alterity 
involves an always precarious commitment to the ‘lesser violence’.88 
 
In other words, by adding an abstract prescription to his critique, Campbell 
seems to re-enact the paradox of the politics of critique: whenever critique pretends to 
secure an authoritative ground it undermines its legitimacy. With all sympathy for the 
‘excluded’, the ‘victimised’ and the ‘disempowered’, our critical reflexes against the 
totalising aspects of traditional morality should not be exhausted in a defence of a 
reversed totality, this time in the form of radical alterity.
89
Exclusion is always an 
exercise of power, as Carl Schmitt has persuasively shown us, but so is the exclusion 
of the exclusion. In thinking that they have found a point of opposition to domination 
by way of choosing ‘deterritorialization’ over ‘territoriality’, post-structuralists tend to 
become co-opted by the same logic they seek to transgress: it is by overlooking that 
the very point of opposition is the instrument through which domination works that 
the powers of domination are reinforced. Judith Butler explains this most lucidly: 
“Dominance appears most effectively precisely as its ‘Other’. The collapse of the 
dialectic gives us a new perspective because it shows us that the very schema by 
which dominance and opposition are distinguished dissimulates the instrumental use 
that the former makes of the latter.”90 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper was principally concerned with the way some sophisticated critical 
approaches in IR tend to reproduce the paradoxes of the politics of critique in their 
engagement with the self/other problematique. It has been suggested that their 
understanding of otherness is theoretically informed by the two antithetical 
philosophical responses to the enigma of alterity, namely relative vs. absolute 
otherness. Hegel’s attempt to show the inadequateness and self-subversiveness of 
abstracted forms of universality have alerted us to the illusions of pure identity but 
have also forced us to confront the limits of a relative engagement with otherness. In 
contrast, Levinas’ alternative understanding of alterity calls for a relationship between 
self and other that regards heteronomous responsibility towards the other as prior to 
any consciousness or intentionality required for the self’s awareness of and capacity 
for communication but achieves that at the expense of rendering the other almost 
unintelligible. Derrida, perhaps too hastily, agrees with Levinas in identifying a 
totalising impetus in Hegel’s logic; yet, when it comes to the issue of how we relate to 
the other Derrida recognises a certain indispensability in Hegel. Ultimately, Derrida’s 
critique of Levinas reminds us that there can be no relation to alterity outside the 
horizon of immanence and invites us to accept the inevitability of committing 
violence to alterity as a condition of the possibility of even speaking intelligibly about 
it. 
Moving to critical international theory, despite dialogic cosmopolitanism’s, 
emphasis on solidarity and reconciliation between universality and difference, its 
critical discourse remains beset by the contradictions of the Kantian critical project: 
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formalism’s arbitrariness and the inability of reason to justify the grounds for its 
legislative authority. In fact, both dialogic cosmopolitan responses to pluralism and 
Foucauldian post-structuralist IR theory hold that the purpose of freedom is best 
achieved through the exercise of critique. As such they find themselves entangled in 
the paradoxes of the politics of critique just like Kant. This has direct ramifications on 
the possibilities for communication between radically different cultures, since 
interpreting universality as resting on procedural impartiality (discourse ethics in 
Linklater) or a prediscursive ontology (language as the human condition in Shapcott) 
or, even, construing freedom as the capacity of all human beings to exercise critique 
(Ashley and Walker) is already a judgement prior to the actual engagement with the 
other that threatens to reduce their version of universality to a defence of another 
exclusionary particularism. 
Among post-structuralist approaches, Campbell’s ethics of radical 
interdependence deserves a special attention since it calls for a relationship with 
alterity in its own terms and, thus, less predetermined by the strategic demands of the 
interaction. However, Campbell’s ethical responsibility to the other allows limited 
space for the other’s responsibility to the self. In parallel, it seems that the Levinasian 
concern for the inviolability of the other renders alterity almost inaccessible. In the 
final analysis, post-structuralist critique, when fixated with the purposive valorisation 
of heteronomy as opposed to autonomy, is always in danger of substituting one 
totality for another, thus becoming co-opted by the dominant Western discourse of 
universalism as the legitimate, politically correct and, eventually, domesticated voice 
of dissidence. This propensity of universality to be contaminated by the particular 
contexts it seeks to transcend seems to be a direct offshoot of the Derridian contention 
that there can be no unthematisable and non-violent ethical relation to the other 
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outside the ontological thematisation performed irreducibly by language. Claims that 
fail to remain thoroughly conscious of this caveat by slipping into a certain kind of 
normative prescription risk compromising their critical credentials.  By understanding 
critical normativity as total non-violence towards, or unreflective affirmation of, 
alterity they tend to relapse to precritical paths, i.e. either a particularistic, assimilative 
universalism with pretensions of true universality or radical separatism and the 
impossibility of communication with the other. 
This latter aphorism may easily leave us with the disconcerting impression 
that critical theorising in IR will always be bedeviled by the failure of grounding the 
authority of critique. It is not the purpose of this paper to prescribe passivity exactly 
because it does not understand critique as a practice that can either succeed or fail.
91
 
For this reason, it does not perceive the impossibility of theoretically overriding the 
self/other divide without reproducing the terms of its re-emergence as a source of 
discouragement; rather, it is a failure we should -in a manner similar to Heidegger’s 
but, perhaps, less fatalistically- heroically assume provided we develop a proper 
understanding of the terms of this failure. This paper has not argued that the critical 
IR approaches examined here are not conscious of the persistency of the self/other 
enigma. Rather, it has attempted to show that, to the extent critical thinking in IR 
theory either fails to adequately address its ungroundable universalism or instantiates 
a puritan ideal of eliminating injustice against alterity, it winds up betraying the key 
element of a critical attitude towards difference. Namely, the idea that the 
irresolvability of the self/other conundrum is at the same time the condition of 
possibility for pursuing it. What is, perhaps, more important than seeking a final 
overcoming or dismissal of the self/other opposition is to gain the insight that it is the 
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perpetual striving to preserve the tension and ambivalence between self and other that 
rescues both critique’s authority and function. 
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